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Abstract-This study presents a model which can help policymakers to determine the tax 
scales and rates which would have an optimal redistributive effect, taking into account the 
budgetary needs and the negative ffects of an increase in the fiscal charge on the demand and 
on the supply of labor of the households. 
The taxation model presented calculates the tax function which minimizes Atkinson’s 
inequality measure, while ensuring a constant tax yield and limiting the increase in tax 
pressure. 
This article contains a description of the model and a presentation of the results obtained 
by applying the model to Belgium. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to construct a tool which can help policymakers to determine the tax scales 
and rates which would have an optimal redistributive effect, taking into account the 
budgetary demands and the negative effects of an increase in the fiscal charge on the demand 
and on the supply of labor of the households. This work falls within the context of studies 
on tax reform; it does not concern an optimal taxation model aiming to construct de novo 
an optimal taxation system’, but rather a model aiming at an optimal reform of an existing 
income tax. 
The taxation model set out in this article calculates the tax function which minimizes 
Atkinson’s [2] coefficient of inequality, while ensuring a constant tax yield and limiting the 
increase in tax pressure. 
The first three sections are devoted to a description of the model. The following sections 
set out the results obtained by applying the model to Belgium. It appears that the use of the 
model would make it possible to significantly increase the redistributive effect of income tax 
without generating considerable economic disorder. 
1. Description of the model: the social welfare function 
The model aims to calculate the parameters of the tax function which optimize a social 
welfare function, while taking into account a tax yield constraint; and constraints, which aim 
to reduce the negative effects of income redistribution on economic growth by imposing a 
limit on the increase in tax pressure. 
In this section we shall describe the social welfare function, the tax function, and the 
‘See Feldstein [4]. 
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constraints of the model. As far as the social welfare function is concerned, we have chosen 
to minimize an inequality index, following the example of Cooter and Helpman [3]. 
The choice of such a criterion favors the aim of income redistribution and is closely akin 
to Lerner’s [8] egalitarian theory, according to which social welfare is maximized by an 
egalitarian distribution of incomes. Minimizing an inequality index makes it possible, 
moreover, to avoid the problems linked to the specification and aggregation of individual 
utility functions. 
We have chosen Atkinson’s coefficient, which contains a parameter 6 reflecting aversion 
to inequality. Any other index, providing it is continuous and derivable, could be introduced 
into this model. The function of social welfare to be optimized is Atkinson’s coefficient: AT. 
1-c 
1 
1 
XJI ~ l-t 
where 
TINC = the net taxable income of individual i, 
7’i = the tax paid by individual i, calculated using the tax function set out below, 
f; = the frequency of occurrence of individual i, 
n = total number of individuals. 
2. The tax function 
a(TINC,-X)-blog 
TINC,-X+c 1 for TINC, > X, c 
0 for TINCi < X (2) 
where 
a, b, c > 0 = the parameters to be calculated, 
X = the minimum taxable income b < a x c, 
a = the maximum marginal rate of taxation. 
In the majority of models of optimal taxation, the tax functions of a linear or logarithmic 
form only have one parameter. (2) is more developed; it is akin to existing progressive tax 
scales and rates, which if the case arises, it can easily replace. This condition is indispensable 
in the context of tax reform. This function comprises a linear term, whose tendency is 
tempered by a logarithmic term. It is continuous and derivable; its first and second derivatives 
are positive and its third derivative is negative. The average rate of taxation is a monotonic 
increasing and concave function of income, the marginal rate is a monotonic increasing and 
convex function. The marginal rate is above the average rate, both being between 0 and 1 
and equal when income tends towards infinity. 
3. The constraints 
The constraint of yield. The model determines the optimal tax distribution, for a constant 
tax yield. We can solve it for different amounts of total yield; but working in the framework 
of partial analysis, the model does not enable us to determine the optimal macroeconomic 
yield. 
$, 4 = desired tax yield 
Constraints imposing a limit on tax pressure. It is difficult, for want of available data, to 
introduce constraints which reflect the effect of tax on the supply of labor. We can introduce 
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constraints which limit tax pressure in order to avoid there being too great an effect on the 
supply of labor and private consumption. 
In the absence of precise data, we have determined a limit to the additional tax pressure 
which amounts to 10% of tax paid previously. For Belgium, this limit corresponds to the 
maximum increase for taxpayers which resulted from the institution of the “additional tenth” 
by the law of March 31, 1967 for the tax year of 1968 (1967 incomes). 
These constraints are of the form 
where Ii represents the tax paid previously by the ith individual. 
4. Application to Belgium: the data used in the model 
The data come from tax statistics by poll concerning 1973 incomes (tax year 1974).’ We 
have used the series relating to net taxable income and to tax for all taxpayers grouped in 
deciles. For estimates concerning separate taxation of the incomes of husband and wife, we 
have used the series relating to incomes jointly taxable, and the series relating to the second 
declarant’s taxable earned income and the allowances on the earned income of his/her spouse. 
5. Procedure and solution of the model 
The solution of the model corresponds to the optimization of a nonlinear function 
subjected to constraints which are also nonlinear. This problem is one of the most difficult 
problems to solve in mathematical programming. As the techniques developed to solve the 
problems of linear optimization are effective, most of the methods proposed for nonlinear 
problems are based on their linearization. 
We have used a program constructed by Abadie and Guigou3 [l] based on the method of 
the generalized reduced gradient which Himmelblau [6, 2211 indicates as being among the 
most effective. This method enables us to solve mathematical probelms whose economic 
function is linear or nonlinear under constraints which are either linear or nonlinear. The 
function to be optimized and the constraints must be continuously derivable functions. The 
constraints of inequality are transformed into equalities through the introduction of deviation 
variables and artificial variables, if these constraints are not satisfied for the initial values of 
the parameters. The program only ensures the discovery of a local optimum, except in the 
particular case of convex problems for which any local optimum is a global optimum. 
For each simulation we have begun the iterations from many different starting points in 
order to increase the probability of having discovered the global minimum. 
6. Results 
We have looked for parameters of the tax function which produce the minimal value of 
Atkinson’s coefficient by imposing the following constraints: 
1. The additional fiscal charge for each decile is limited to 10% of tax paid in 1973; 
2. The overall yield of personal tax is equal to that obtained in 1973. 
2For a description of these statistics, see Bulletins Statistiques de l’INS, Nr. 2 (1974), Nr. 8-9 (1974) and Nr. 
2 (1975). 
‘The generalized reduced gradient method is set out in Abadie, J. and Guigou, J. (1969): “Gradient riduit 
Gkntralise”, Electriciti de France, Note H1069/02, 15 April. 
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First, the calculations concerned the determining of an optimal function for the value 1.5 
of the parameter t of Atkinson’s coefficient, with the tax basis and unit being unchanged with 
respect to the existing situation. 
Second, we have calculated the optimal functions by modifying the yield constraint, the 
tax basis, and the tax unit. 
7. Solution of the model for the value E = 1.5 of Atkinson’s coeficient 
The parameter c of Atkinson’s coefficient represents an aversion to inequality. It varies 
between 0 and + co. For c = 0.5 the results of Atkinson’s coefficient are close to those 
obtained with Gini’s coefficient, and for the values c = 1.5 and c = 2.0 it produces results 
comparable to the standard deviation of the income logarithm. We have solved the model 
for t = 1.5, a value which reflects a fairly strong aversion to inequality. This function will 
serve as a reference when we examine the different alternatives studied in the following 
sections. It represents the profit in terms of redistribution which could have been obtained 
by modifying only the taxation scale, with the tax basis and unit remaining unchanged with 
respect to the existing situation. The results are given in Table 1. 
In 1973, by replacing the scale by a continuous function minimizing Atkinson’s coefficient, 
one could have obtained a considerable profit in terms of redistribution by taxation. 
To obtain this profit, the maximum marginal rate a would have gone up from 0.66 to 
0.7722. 
The comparison between the taxes paid by the different deciles shows that for a 10% tax 
increase borne by the 9th and 10th deciles, one ends up with a drop in the fiscal charge of 
the first seven deciles, with this drop being as much as 73.4% and 53.7% for the second and 
third deciles. For the 9th and 10th deciles, the constraints are tight and limit redistribution 
through tax. The total sum transferred is 10.6 billion Belgian francs (BF). 
The comparison of average marginal rates shows that these rates are lower for the first 
five deciles and that they increase for the last five deciles, with the average income of the last 
decile being subjected to a marginal rate of 55%. 
8. ModiJication of the tax yield constraint 
In order to measure the impact on the optimal redistributive effect of tax of a drop in the 
total yield, we have replaced the yield constraint 
Table 1. Solution of the model for the value = 1.5 of Atkinson’s coefficient 
Parameters a b c 
Atkinson’s 
coefficient 
Existing scale 
Computed function 
c = 1.5 
0.66 
0.7722 
245,357.0 488,823.0 0.408 
204,413.O 270,108.O 0.392 
Deciles 
Percentage variation in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
tax pressure No 
per decile tax -73.4 -53.7 -37.6 -27.2 -16.2 - 10.5 +1.0 +10.0 +10.0 
Average marginal rate 
existing scale 0.0 17.9 20.7 23.1 25.3 27.2 29.0 32.1 35.2 44.4 
Average marginal rate 
computed function 
t = 1.5 0.0 7.1 13.9 19.5 24.0 27.9 31.1 36.7 41.8 55.0 
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$, Ii = CI x tax yield in 1973, 
where a represents a chosen percentage equal to 85 and 95%. 
The results are given in Table 2. 
The study of the optimal tax yield falls within a macroeconomic perspective which goes 
beyond the framework of this partial equilibrium model. 
With respect to the existing situation, the analysis of the effects of the modification of the 
yield constraint enables us to note that: 
1. Atkinson’s coefficient is lower than that obtained with the scale. It is therefore possible to obtain 
an improvement in the redistributive effect of tax for a lower yield; 
2. In order to do this, one must choose a more progressive tax function with a maximum marginal rate 
of 1 at infinity and higher values of b and c; 
3. When the tax yield drops, tax pressure becomes lighter. For a yield of 85x, only the 10th decile has 
a tax increase of 10%. The total sum transferred is almost 8 billion BF; 
4. The marginal rates of taxation calculated for the average incomes of the deciles are lower for the 
first eight deciles, and higher for the 9th and 10th deciles. 
Comparison with the reference function indicates that: 
1. The minimum value of Atkinson’s coefficient increases if the personal tax yield drops, with the sum 
to be redistributed between taxpayers decreasing; 
2. The maximum marginal rates are higher, and so is parameter c. These increases are compensated 
for by a parallel increase in 6; 
3. The tax pressure per decile is less high, because there is less tax to be collected. 
Table 2. Solution of the model after modification of the tax yield constraint 
Parameters 
Existing scale 
Reference 
Computed function 
a = 0.85 
cf. = 0.95 
a b c 
0.66 245,357.0 488,823.0 
0.7722 204,413.O 270,108.O 
1.0 506,115.O 506,115.O 
1.0 450,896.O 450,896.O 
Atkinson’s 
coefficient 
0.408 
0.392 
0.402 
0.394 
Percentage 
variation in tax 
pressure per decile 
Reference function 
Computed function 
a = 0.85 
a = 0.95 
Average marginal rate 
Existing scale 
Reference function 
Computed function 
t( = 0.85 
a = 0.95 
1 2 
No tax - 73.4 
3 
- 53.7 
4 5 6 
-37.6 -27.2 - 16.2 
8 9 10 
- 10.5 + 1.0 + 10.0 + 10.0 
No tax - 87.5 
No tax -77.6 
17.9 
7.1 
-72.1 
-61.4 
20.7 
13.9 
4.1 9.5 
4.6 10.5 
-58.8 -49.5 -39.3 
-47.5 - 38.2 -27.5 
23.1 25.3 27.2 
19.5 24.0 27.9 
14.2 18.4 22.2 
15.7 20.2 24.2 
-33.2 - 20.5 - 16.9 + 10.0 
-21.5 -8.9 +1.5 +10.0 
29.0 32.1 
31.1 36.7 
25.5 31.7 
27.8 34.2 
35.2 44.4 
41.8 55.0 
37.7 56.2 
40.5 59.0 
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The only tight constraint is that affecting the 10th decile, which pays tax 10% higher than 
in 1973. The marginal rates are less than those of [2], except for the 10th decile. 
9. Change in the minimum taxable income 
The fixing of the minimum taxable income is linked to the study of poverty thresholds. 
In order to study the main characteristics of the model, we have calculated the effects on 
the optimal tax function of a variation in the minimum taxable income, which we increased 
by fixed amounts of 10,000 BF. 
The results are given in Table 3. 
The results of this simulation indicate that beyond the threshold of 73,000 BF, there is 
no acceptable solution to the model. The tax pressure, which increases by 10% for the 9th 
and 10th deciles, can no longer be increased in order to obtain sufficient tax yield. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Comparison of the results-with the existing situation shows that: 
Atkinson’s coefficient improves considerably when the minimum taxable income is increased; 
This improvement takes place at the expense of a considerable increase in the maximum marginal 
rate, of a drop in b and c; 
The tax pressure per decile is greatly reduced for deciles 2, 3, and 4; for deciles 5, 6, and 7 there 
is less of a reduction; only deciles 9 and 10 undergo an increase of 10%. The marginal rate is lower 
for deciles 2, 3, and 4 and higher for the other deciles. 
Comparison with the results obtained if the minimum taxable income rises from 35,000 
to 73,000 BF shows that: 
1. Atkinson’s coefficient experiences a fairly small drop of 0.002; 
2. The three parameters of the function increase in order to compensate the drops in yield brought 
about by the exclusion of taxpayers whose incomes are lower than the new minimum taxable income; 
3. Tax pressure per decile is reduced for deciles 2, 3, and 4, with taxpayers in the second decile being 
exempt from tax; for taxpayers in deciles 5, 6, 7, and 8, however, tax pressure is higher for a minimum 
taxable income of 73,000 BF. The total sum transferred is 10.9 billion BF; 
Table 3. Solution of the model after change in the minimum taxable income 
Parameters a 
Existing scale 0.66 
Reference function 0.7722 
X = 45,000 0.7808 
X = 55,000 0.8081 
x = 65,000 0.8627 
X = 73,000 0.9859 
b c 
245,357.0 488,823.0 
204,413.O 270,108.O 
211,692.O 293,621.0 
248,933.0 346,992.0 
328,985.0 450,598.O 
537,576.0 661,992.O 
Atkinson’s 
coefficient 
0.408 
0.392 
0.391 
0.391 
0.390 
0.390 
Percentage variation Deciles 
in tax pressure 
per decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Reference function -73.4 - 53.7 -37.6 -27.2 - 16.2 - 10.5 +1.0 +10.0 +10.0 
45,000 No tax -79.4 -54.4 -37.5 -27.1 - 16.0 - 10.5 + 1.4 +10.0 + 10.0 
55,000 No tax -95.9 - 56.4 -37.2 -26.7 -15.2 -9.7 +1.7 +10.0 +10.0 
65,000 No tax No tax - 62.3 -38.1 -26.1 - 14.4 -9.0 f2.0 +10.0 + 10.0 
73,000 No tax No tax -68.0 - 39.6 -25.7 -13.4 -8.1 f2.6 + 10.0 +lO.O 
Average marginal rate 
Existing scale 17.9 20.7 23.1 25.3 27.2 29.0 32.1 35.2 44.4 
Reference 7.1 13.9 19.5 24.0 27.9 31.1 36.7 41.8 55.0 
Computed function 0.0 19.2 22.6 27.9 32.2 35.8 41.9 47.5 61.5 
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4. Except for the 2nd decile, the marginal rates are higher for all the deciles; tax is heavier for the deciles 
which do not escape it. 
10. Change in the basis of taxation 
In Belgium, there is a set of fiscal expenditures which are inegalitarian. In order to abolish 
certain expenditures and to replace others with direct subsidies, as we suggested with Frank 
[5], an additional tax yield of 21.9 billion BF must be obtained. This additional yield cannot 
be obtained if the increase in fiscal charge is limited to 10% for each decile. 
We have therefore lifted these constraints for the simulation of this proposal. The 
relaxation of these constraints could cause too great a rise in the tax pressure per decile, which 
would harm economic growth. The distribution of new direct subsidies between taxpayers will 
determine the effects of the abolition of expenditures on the supply of labor and individual 
consumption. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
1. 
2. 
We have modified the yield constraint as follows: 
,g, Z, = tax yield f rom personal income in 1973 + fiscal expenditure to be 
reallocated in the form of direct subsidies = 21.9 billion B.F. 
The results are given in Table 4. 
When examining the results and comparing them with the existing situation we see that: 
Atkinson’s coefficient drops considerably and reaches 0.386; 
With the constraints on maximum increase lifted, the maximum marginal rate of taxation reaches 
1.0; 
The fiscal charge increases for the 9th and 10th deciles by about 20%. For the other deciles, we note 
a fairly slight drop in tax pressure for the first five deciles; 
The marginal rates are lower for the first four deciles; for the other deciles, the rise increases. For 
the 10th decile, the marginal rate rises from 44 to 58%. 
Comparison with the reference function indicates that: 
The lifting of constraints and the abolition of fiscal expenditures makes it possible to achieve a lower 
value of Atkinson’s coefficient; 
The marginal rate rises from 0.7722 to 1 .O, a maximum value which is reached because of the lifting 
of constraints on the tax pressure which the deciles are subjected to; 
Table 4. Solution of the model after change in the basis of taxation 
Parameters 
Existing scale 
Reference function 
Change in the basis 
Percentage variation 
in tax pressure 
Atkinson’s 
a b c coefficient 
0.66 245,357.O 488,823.0 0.408 
0.7722 204,413.O 270,108.O 0.392 
1.0 546,932.0 546,932.0 0.386 
Declines 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Reference function No tax -73.4 -53.7 -37.6 -27.2 - 16.2 - 10.5 +1.0 +10.0 +10.0 
Change in the basis No tax -13.4 - 12.2 - 10.5 -9.4 +4.7 +7.3 +16.1 + 18.5 f22.3 
Average marginal rate 
Existing scale 17.9 20.7 23.1 25.3 27.2 29.0 32.1 35.2 44.4 
Reference function 7.1 13.9 19.5 24.0 27.9 31.1 36.7 41.8 55.0 
Computed function 11.1 15.1 19.8 23.8 27.8 30.9 36.6 42.0 58.0 
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3. The tax pressure is higher for all the deciles. This is due to the fact that 21.9 billion BF of additional 
tax must be collected in order to be reallocated in the form of direct subsidies. The total sum 
transferred is 6.4 billion BF; 
4. The change in the basis changes the tax function’s form. The marginal rates calculated with respect 
to the new basis are higher for the first deciles, with their net taxable income undergoing the greatest 
percentage rise; the marginal rates are slightly lower for the intermediate deciles and are higher for 
the 9th and 10th deciles. 
11. Change in the unit of taxation 
We have calculated the optimal tax function assuming that husband and wife are taxed 
separately. 
The tax function has been applied separately to the incomes of declarants in households 
on one income, of male and female declarants in households on two incomes. 
The minimized Atkinson coefficient has been calculated on the weighted sums of net 
taxable incomes less the tax of these three kinds of taxpayer. 
The results are given in Table 5. 
When analyzing the results and comparing them with the existing situation we see that: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The redistributive effect of tax can be improved if joint taxation of the incomes of husband and wife 
is abolished; 
To achieve this result, it is necessary to increase the maximum marginal rate of taxation and to reduce 
parameters b and c; 
In this case tax pressure per decile drops considerably for the first eight deciles. It increases by 4% 
for the 9th decile and by 10% for the 10th decile, for which the constraint is tightened. The total 
sum transferred is 9 billion BF: 
The marginal rates, still calculated on the average incomes of households, are lower for the first four 
deciles, and reach 61.9% for the 10th decile. 
Comparison of the results with those of the reference function indicates that: 
Redistribution is less and Atkinson’s coefficient is higher; 
The maximum marginal rate increases; 
The reduction in tax pressure is smaller for the first seven deciles. The 8th and 9th deciles include 
Table 5. Solution of the model after change in the unit of taxation 
Atkinson’s 
Parameters a b C coefficient 
Existing scale 
Reference function 
Computed function: 
separate taxation 
0.66 
0.7722 
0.84705 
Percentage variation 
in tax pressure 
per decile 1 2 
Reference function No tax -73.4 
Separate taxation No tax -71.6 
Average marginal rate 
Existing scale 17.9 
Reference function 7.1 
Separate taxation 8.3 
245,357.0 488,823.0 
204,413.O 270,108.O 
204,400.O 246,071 .O 
Deciles 
0.408 
0.392 
0.399 
3 4 5 6 7 
- 53.7 -37.6 -27.2 - 16.2 - 10.5 
- 50.0 -31.6 -22.9 -15.1 -8.6 
20.7 23.1 25.3 27.2 29.0 
13.9 19.5 24.0 27.9 31.1 
16.4 22.7 28.0 32.3 36.0 
8 9 10 
+l.O +10.0 +10.0 
-2.3 +4.1 +10.0 
32.1 35.2 44.4 
36.7 41.8 55.0 
42.2 47.7 61.9 
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a considerable number of households with two declarants, and are better off than they would be in 
the optimal situation in the event of joint taxation; 
4. To obtain a constant tax yield, tax pressure, which in the event of separate taxation no longer applies 
to households but to individuals, is higher. The marginal rates have therefore increased with respect 
to the second reference function. 
12. Conclusion 
The taxation model set out in this article makes it possible, despite the absence of data 
concerning the supply of labor and individual utilities, to calculate the tax function which 
leads to a fairer distribution of incomes. 
The simulations of alternative policies show that it is possible to significantly improve the 
redistributive effect of tax by replacing the scale with a continuous tax function, stemming 
from the minimization of a coefficient of inequality. 
The abolition of joint taxation of a husband and wife’s incomes and the change in the basis 
of taxation can generate a tax which is more fairly distributed between the taxpayers of the 
different deciles, provided that the scale is replaced by a continuous function which involves 
a higher maximum marginal rate. 
From a more technical point of view, the different simulations showed that the model 
constructed in this way is a tool which makes it possible to calculate the optimal tax function, 
which may well replace the scale whatever the basis or unit of taxation retained. 
Subsequent developments of this model concerned with taking transfers into account and 
with the impact of change in distribution of available income on private consumption would 
make it possible to go beyond the framework of a partial analysis and to tackle the 
macroeconomic impact of taxation. 
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